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I. Introduction 
In this contribution I engage with one of the thorniest and most controversial topics to bedevil 
international law concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict. First, I outline the 
various approaches to the problem from 1996 onwards, and my own – radical perhaps – 
response in 2009. Next, I turn to the fruitful jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission 
and Court of Human Rights. Third, I engage with the refusal, perhaps wisely, of the European 
Court of Human Rights to engage with the spectre of lex specialis as a means of resolving the 
apparent tension between international human rights law (IHRL) and international 
humanitarian law (IHL) or the law of armed conflict. This culminated in the 2014 Grand 
Chamber judgment in Hassan v UK. Lastly, I turn to a recent intervention by the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
 
II. What Are the Issues? 
The issue of the application of IHRL and IHL was posed in 1996 in Paragraph 25 of the 
International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons.2  
The Court observed that ‘the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights does not cease in times of war,’ with the exception of course of those rights that, under 
Article 4, may be derogated from ‘(i)n time of public emergency which threatens the life of 
the nation’. This means that ‘(i)n principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life 
applies also in hostilities’.  
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The Court observed, however, that ‘the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life . . . falls 
to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict.’ It concluded therefore that ‘whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a 
certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to 
Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed 
conflict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.’ 
In 2004 Vera Gowlland-Debbas explained that  
‘The Court accepts the continuing applicability of the Covenant in time of armed 
conflict, from which it may be inferred that it acknowledges the complementarity of 
human rights and humanitarian law. Its reference to the lex specialis cannot therefore 
mean the displacement of human rights by humanitarian law, at least to the extent of 
the nonderogable rights, in time of armed conflict. It should be pointed out that the 
maxim lex specialis derogat generali was traditionally applied only as a discretionary 
aid in interpreting conflicting but potentially applicable treaty rules. It is not relevant 
in determining the incremental or complementary nature of treaty rules.’3 
In 2007 Nancie Prud’homme sought to ‘demonstrate the inadequacy of the theory of lex 
specialis and the hazard of opting for such a model to articulate the parallel application of 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law’.4 She wanted to lay the 
foundations for alternatives. However, in 2008, Françoise Hampson, referring to three 
judgments of the ICJ5, stated that three interrelated propositions had emerged.6 First, human 
rights law remains applicable even during armed conflict. Second, it is applicable in 
situations of conflict, subject only to derogation. Third, when both IHL and human rights law 
are applicable, IHL is the lex specialis. But the relation between IHL and IHRL had not been 
resolved. She suggested that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had shown the way, 
at least as regards the manner in which IHL can be taken into account.7 However, her 
reference was to the Inter-American Commission, which had only dealt with such situations 
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under the Inter-American Declaration of Human Rights, under which it did not deliver 
binding legal judgments.8 
I took a more radical position in 20099, suggesting that ‘Chalk is being compared with, or 
even substituted by, cheese. Or still worse, the two are being mixed together: chalky cheese is 
horribly indigestible, while cheesy chalk is no good at all for writing on black-boards’.10 I 
argued that at the most superficial level, IHL and IHRL have much in common.11 Both are 
bodies of law ratified by states and binding on states. In both cases there are large multilateral 
treaties, ratified by most states. But there the similarity ends. There are significant differences 
between the law of armed conflict and human rights law.  
The first relates to history. IHL is far older than IHRL. It is to be found at the beginning of 
recorded history, on the earliest recorded interactions between polities.12 IHRL, on the other 
hand, did not exist in any form before the eighteenth century, when it first emerged in the 
declaration and bills of the French and American Revolutions.13 Even then, it formed part of 
domestic, constitutional law rather than international law, and only found its place in 
international law after World War I. 
The second concerns the character of the normative structures themselves. IHL is, I asserted, 
intrinsically conservative, taking armed conflict as a given, as indeed it always has been in 
human society. Prior to the Red Cross codification, IHL was known as 'the laws and customs 
of war'. There is, on the other hand, no such pre-history for IHRL, which is in principle and 
has in my opinion always been revolutionary, scandalous in its inception, inspired by 
collective action and struggle and threatening to the existing state order.14 
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The third follows from the second, and relates to the nature of the redress provided. Breaches 
of IHL had, until the creation of the International Criminal Court, called for action by one 
state against another, as in the DRC v Uganda case,15 or, as with the Geneva Conventions, 
punishment of 'grave breaches' carried out by individuals. The individuals concerned must be 
investigated and prosecuted by states, or more recently by bodies created by states, through 
the agency of the Security Council or treaty bodies. In either case, the actor seeking redress 
was the state or its surrogate. The victim has had (until the victim provisions in the ICC 
Statute) no standing as such.  
Despite having been established by private actors, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross is a mediator between states, or, as in Additional Protocol II, non-state actors with the 
capacity to control territory. I emphasize that while by virtue of the Geneva Conventions 
states bind themselves to 'respect and ensure respect' for the conventions, the mechanism of 
enforcement is primarily that of national and international criminal law. 
IHRL is the diametrical opposite. It is the province of individual complaint, before the World 
War II to national courts, and following WWII to treaty bodies and mechanisms in which 
states, and not individuals, are brought to account. However, it must be emphasized that the 
initial claimants of the first-generation rights were the revolutionary movements against 
absolutism in the eighteenth century; those of the second generations were typically trade 
unions and other social movements, whose struggles attained legal recognition with the 
creation of the International Labour Organization in 1919. And those of the third generation 
were, as is well known, peoples, notably colonized peoples, fighting for their independence. 
The first and most important of the rights of the third generation is the right of peoples to 
self-determination, finally recognized in common Article 1 of the 1966 International 
Covenants on human rights.16 
From this point IHL has been profoundly marked by developments in IHRL. The anti-
colonial struggles were largely aimed at securing independence within defined, overseas, 
territories – that is, the so-called 'salt-water self-determination', in respect of territories 
separated from the colonial metropolis by seas and oceans, the territories to which the UN 
‘colonial’ declaration of 1960 was directed.17 The non-state protagonists were the 'national 
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liberation movements'.18 That was the period, up to the collapse of the USSR, when the use of 
force by self-determination movements – National Liberation Movements – was not, as is so 
often the case today, characterized as 'terrorism'.19 
Until 1977, when two Additional Protocols were promulgated (API and APII), there was no 
successful attempt to update the rules of conduct of hostilities from those contained in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 so as to take account of use of force in the cause of self-
determination, as Hampson and Salama had pointed out.20 They suggested that 'this may have 
been partly attributable to the reluctance, after both the first and second world wars, to 
regulate a phenomenon which the League of Nations and later the United Nations were 
intended to eliminate or control'.21 However, this is to downplay the significance of the 
Protocols. It is of course the case that, as they note, API dealt with international armed 
conflicts, updating provisions on the wounded and the sick and formulating rules on the 
conduct of hostilities, while APII dealt, for the first time, with high-intensity non-
international armed conflicts.  
In this, they followed Doswald-Beck and Vité, in whose view the most important 
contribution of API 'is the careful delimitation of what can be done during hostilities in order 
to spare civilians as much as possible'.22 However, of a number of scholars recently 
publishing on the tension (or clash) between IHRL and IHL, only William Abresch 
recognised that the Additional Protocols aimed to extend the reach of the existing treaties 
governing international conflicts to internal conflicts: 'thus, Protocol I deemed struggles for 
national liberation to be international conflicts'.23 In other words, if an armed conflict is a 
struggle for national liberation against 'alien occupation' or 'colonial domination' it is 
considered an 'international armed conflict' falling within API.24 
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This, I suggested, was the key to understanding the significance of both Additional Protocols. 
They were the response of the ICRC, and then the overwhelming majority of states that had 
ratified the Protocols, to the new world of 'internationalized' internal conflicts, in the context 
of armed struggle for self-determination by national liberation movements. In this way the 
international legal recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination impacted directly 
on IHL. 
Writing in 201225, Jean d’Aspremont and Elodie Tranchez noted that most lawyers and judges 
have ‘presupposed that norms of IHL and HRL belong to the same legal order and the same 
legal regime and are, at the surface, in conflict with one another.’ On the contrary, these 
authors argue that ‘… the relations between IHL and HRL ought to be construed in terms of 
competition rather than conflict’. Their starting point is that ‘these two branches of 
international law have long lived side by side ignoring one another.’26 They further point out 
that ‘… direct and strict conflicts between IHL and HRL norms hardly exist. Indeed, as was 
explained above, there can be no conflict of norms short of direct and strict 
incompatibilities.’27 Their central argument was 
the scopes of HRL and IHL are now competing ratione loci, ratione personae and 
ratione temporis. Ratione loci since from now HRL is not held to bind States only in 
their territory but also in territories which come under their effective control; ratione 
temporis since HRL is no longer confined to times of peace but also extends to times 
of war; and ratione personae as a result of the application of HRL to intrastate 
conflict situations.28 
Most recently, Françoise Hampson and Daragh Murray returned to the issue in an EJIL Talk 
blog29, concluding that 
… it is essential that human rights bodies address situations of armed conflict in a 
manner that is fully cognisant of the reality of armed conflict. The law of armed 
conflict was established specifically for the purposes of regulating armed conflict. 
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International human rights law was not. While it is perfectly possible to apply 
international human rights law during situations of armed conflict – and while it is 
appropriate and even beneficial that this occurs – doing so requires adapting 
international human rights law in order to acknowledge the distinct context of 
conflict, and the distinct requirements of the law of armed conflict. Accordingly, 
human rights bodies must ensure that they obtain sufficient expertise in relation to the 
law of armed conflict, and States must ensure that they argue their cases coherently 
and effectively. Importantly, States should also ensure that they intervene as third 
parties in relevant cases, so as to assist human rights bodies in appropriately 
operationalising the relationship between the two bodies of rules. 
They were referring in particular to the case of Hassan v UK30, to which I will return. 
These topics continue to excite the interest of many scholars of international law.31 
 
III. The Issues in the Inter-American System 
The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights was the first international body to 
adjudicate cases in which it directly applied IHL, and found States in breach of these norms. 
In 30 October 1997 the Inter-American Commission in the La Tablada case, Argentina, 
examined for the first time whether it was competent to apply IHL directly.32 The case 
concerned an attack launched by 42 armed persons on military barracks of the national armed 
forces in 1989 at La Tablada, Argentina. The attack precipitated a battle lasting 
approximately 30 hours and resulting in the deaths of 29 of the attackers and several State 
agents. The Commission understood that it was ‘competent to apply directly rules of 
international humanitarian law or to inform its interpretations of relevant provisions of the 
American Convention by reference to these rules’33. The Commission argued that ‘It is 
understandable that the provisions of conventional and customary humanitarian law generally 
afford victims of armed conflicts greater or more specific protections than do the more 
generally phrased guarantees in the American Convention and other human rights 
instruments’ (paragraph 159). It understood that its competence to apply humanitarian law 
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rules was supported by the text of the American Convention, by its own case law, as well as 
the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: ‘the American Convention 
itself authorizes the Commission to address questions of humanitarian law in cases involving 
alleged violations of Article 25’. 
However, the Las Palmeras case v. Colombia, decided by the Inter-American Court in 
200134, articulated a jurisdiction limitation in the area of IHL. The Commission brought Las 
Palmeras to the Court after completing an investigation in Colombia into the deaths of at least 
six victims who have been killed extra-judicially by members of the National Police Forces, 
aides by the Colombian armed forces. This was the first case in which the Court addressed 
the application of IHL.  
The Commission stated in the preliminary objections, as a declaration of principle, that ‘the 
instant case should be decided in the light of the norms embodied in both the American 
Convention and in customary international humanitarian law applicable to internal armed 
conflicts and enshrined in Article 3, common to all the 1949 Geneva Conventions.’ The 
Commission reiterated its belief that both the Court and the Commission were competent to 
apply this legislation.
35
 
But the Court understood that the American Convention had only given the Court 
competence to determine whether the acts or the norms of the States parties are compatible 
with the American Convention itself, and not with the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Therefore, 
the Court decided to support the third preliminary objection filed by the State (lack of 
competence of the Court). 
Although Las Palmeras was not a specific case about armed conflict, the Court reinforced its 
opinion in relation to IHL in later cases addressing internal conflict.  
In the Serrano Cruz Sisters Case v. El Salvador (2005) before the Court, the Commission in 
the preliminary objections (2004) had not requested the Court to apply international 
humanitarian law, but to apply the American Convention in order to establish the 
international responsibility of El Salvador for the forced disappearance of the Serrano Cruz 
sisters
36
.  
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The Court referred to the ‘complementarity between international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law and the applicability of the former in times of peace and 
during armed conflict’, and also repeated that the Court is ‘empowered to interpret the norms 
of the American Convention in light of other international treaties’.37 The Court also 
remembered that it had protected members of communities by adopting provisional measures 
‘in light of the provisions of the American Convention and international humanitarian law,’ 
given that they were in a situation of extreme gravity and urgency in the context of an armed 
conflict.
38
 The Court mentioned a wide range of IHL instruments as to the protection of 
victims of international armed conflicts. Also, the Court observed that: 
the State cannot question the full applicability of the human rights embodied in the 
American Convention, based on the existence of a non-international armed conflict. 
The Court considers that it is necessary to reiterate that the existence of a non-
international armed conflict does not exempt the State from fulfilling its obligations to 
respect and guarantee the rights embodied in the American Convention to all persons 
subject to its jurisdiction, or to suspend their application
39
. 
In the case of Bamáca Velazquez (2000)
40
, the Court confirmed its rejection of the direct 
application of IHL, but recognized once again the role of IHL as an interpretative reference 
for cases of armed conflict. The Commission had once again insisted that Guatemala was in 
breach of both the American Convention and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 
as a result of the Guatemala military’s torture and murder of a guerrilla fighter during the 
conflict there
41
. But the Court found violations only of the American Convention, confirming 
its lack of competence to find state violations of a treaty that was not explicitly contemplated 
in the Convention. However, the Court observed that:  
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violated the following rights of Efraín Bámaca Velásquez: art 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), art 4 (Right to 
Life), art 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), art 7 (Right to Personal Liberty), art 8 (Right to a Fair Trial), art 13 
(Freedom of Thought and Expression), art 25 (Right to Judicial Protection) and art 1 (Obligation to Respect 
Rights), all of the American Convention, and also arts 1, 2 and 6 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent 
and Punish Torture and art 3 common to the Geneva Conventions. (Bámaca-Velásquez v Guatemala (n 40) para 
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Although the Court lacks competence to declare that a State is internationally 
responsible for the violation of international treaties that do not grant it such 
competence, it can observe that certain acts or omissions that violate human rights, 
pursuant to the treaties that they do have competence to apply, also violate other 
international instruments for the protection of the individual, such as the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and, in particular, common Article 3.
42
  
The Court ‘has already indicated in the Las Palmeras Case (2000), that the relevant 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions may be taken into consideration as elements for the 
interpretation of the American Convention’ (par. 209). So the organs of the Inter-American 
System can employ IHL as an interpretive tool.  
The Court’s jurisprudence has reaffirmed on many occasions the importance of 
contextualizing human rights law within the broader scope of public international law, 
arguing that IHL can be extremely useful to achieve better interpretation of the human rights 
law in a context in which IHL applies. In the case Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia (2005) 
the Court held:   
While it is clear that this Court cannot attribute international responsibility under 
International Humanitarian Law, as such, said provisions are useful to interpret the 
Convention, in the process of establishing the responsibility of the State and other 
aspects of the violations alleged in the instant case. These provisions were in force for 
Colombia at the time of the facts, as international treaty agreements to which the State 
is a party, and as domestic law, and the Constitutional Court of Colombia has declared 
them to be jus cogens provisions, which are part of the Colombian ‘constitutional 
block’ and are mandatory for the States and for all armed State and non-State actors 
involved in an armed conflict
43
.  
In the case of The Santo Domingo Massacre v Colombia (30 November 2012),44 the Court 
reaffirmed its capacity to use IHL as lex specialis when adjudicating an alleged breach of 
human rights under the American Convention that had occurred in a context of armed 
conflict. This interpretation of the jurisdictional limits within the American Convention 
resulted in an end to the Commission’s capacity to find direct violations of IHL by states.  
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 Bámaca-Velásquez v Guatemala (n 40) para 208.  
43
Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia (Merits, Reparations and Costs) Inter American Court of Human Rights 
Series C No 134 (15 September 2005) para 115. 
44
 See ‘Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia (IACtHR)’ Weapons Law Encyclopedia (1 December 2013) 
www.weaponslaw.org/cases/iacthr-santo-domingo-massacre . 
11 
 
Despite this, the use of IHL as an interpretive tool within the Inter-American System has 
remained useful and necessary.  
In Santo Domingo the Court conducted its analysis in part on the basis of the rules of IHL 
governing the conduct of hostilities. The Court addressed the rules of proportionality and of 
distinction, but its analysis focused on the obligation to take precautionary measures. The 
Court highlighted a range of factors about the cluster munition that was used, including the 
wide impact area of its six submunitions. It called the cluster munition an imprecise weapon 
(‘una arma imprecisa’) and considered that the use of any air-dropped explosive weapon 
(‘armamento explosivo’) was dangerous, and therefore needed to be strictly controlled to 
ensure that damage would only be caused to the selected target. The Court found that the 
instructions given for the weapon’s employment were imprecise, especially with respect to 
the minimum distance of the strike location to the village, and noted that military manuals in 
use in December 1998 indicated that this type of weapon should not be used in or near a 
populated area. In view of the weapon’s lethality and its limited accuracy (‘capacidad letal y 
la precisión limitada’) the Court concluded that the use of the cluster munition in or near the 
village of Santo Domingo violated the attacker’s precautionary obligations under IHL, and 
consequently, amounted to a violation, by Colombia, of the rights to life and to physical, 
mental, and moral integrity under the American Convention.
45
 
After these cases before the Court in which the use of IHL as lex specialis was established, in 
the limited sense of a tool for helping interpret human rights under the Convention, the 
Commission had to deal with many cases involving armed conflict and the application of 
IHL. It seems that the Court’s decision has changed the Commission’s position. The 
Commission started following the Court, using IHL as an interpretative tool, but declining to 
find direct violations of IHL legal instruments: Rio Frio Massacre v. Colombia (2001)
46
; 
Ana, Beatriz and Celia González Pérez v. Mexico (2001)
47
.  
The evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence can be seen in the 2014 Case of Rodriguez Vera et 
al (The disappeared from the Palace of Justice) v Colombia.
48
 This case concerned one of the 
most notorious events in recent Colombian history. In 1985, the Palace of Justice, Colombia's 
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Supreme Court, was stormed and seized by members of the M-19 guerilla group. State 
security forces used disproportionate and excessive force in their fight to retake the Palace of 
Justice. As a result, many hostages in the building were killed by the use of automatic 
weapons, grenades, bombs, and the fires that ensued. Further, once the Palace of Justice had 
been retaken, special forces detained many innocent survivors, and transferred them to 
military locations, where they were tortured, beaten, and ultimately executed. The Court 
found that the State violated the American Convention, the Inter-American Convention to 
Prevent and Punish Torture, and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons. 
The Court held (para 39) in terms which it is worth setting out in full: 
In the instant case, neither the Commission nor the representatives have asked the 
Court to declare the State responsible for possible violations of norms of international 
humanitarian law. In accordance with Article 29(b) of the American Convention and 
the general rules for the interpretation of treaties contained in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, the American Convention can be interpreted in 
relation to other international instruments. Starting with the case of Las Palmeras v. 
Colombia, the Court has indicated that the relevant provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions may be taken into account as elements for interpreting the American 
Convention. Therefore, when examining the compatibility with the Convention of a 
State’s actions or norms, the Court may interpret the obligations and the rights 
contained in this instrument in light of other treaties. In this case, by using 
international humanitarian law as a norm of interpretation that complements the 
Convention, the Court is not ranking the different laws, because the applicability and 
relevance of international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict is not in 
doubt. It merely means that the Court may observe the rules of international 
humanitarian law as a specific law in the matter, in order to apply the norms of the 
Convention more precisely when defining the scope of the State’s obligations. Hence, 
if necessary, the Court may refer to provisions of international humanitarian law when 
interpreting the obligations contained in the American Convention in relation to the 
facts of this case. Consequently, the Court rejects this preliminary objection. 
As will be seen, the Inter-American Court has worked its way to a position very similar to 
that of the Strasbourg Court. 
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IV. The Strasbourg Court: Turning a Blind Eye to the Issues? 
Immediately prior to the public hearing at the ECtHR of the first six Chechen cases against 
Russia,49 the applicants' lawyers, including the present author, argued between themselves 
whether it would assist their clients, the victims of gross violations of the right to life and 
other ECHR rights, to refer to or to rely upon the jurisprudence of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). They decided – rightly - not to. 
Arnold and Quenivet co-edited a book suggesting that there is a 'new merger' between IHL 
and IHRL.50 As the introduction puts it: 'At the heart of the enquiry is whether the two bodies 
of law, IHL and IHRL have finally merged into a single set of laws'.51 The editors cite Cerna's 
remark52 that IHL ‘evolved as a result of humanity's concerns for the victims of war, whereas 
human rights law evolved as a result of humanity's concern for the victims of a new kind of 
internal war – the victims of Nazi death camps’.  
It will be plain from my remarks above that, pace Cerna, this is as far from what actually 
happened as could be the case. I repeat that laws and customs of war have accompanied the 
use of armed force since the beginning of history, while human rights are much more recent, 
but pre-existed the Holocaust. 
In her own chapter in the collection, commenting on the Chechen cases, Quenivet asserted 
that the Strasbourg Court 'never assessed whether military operations conducted by state 
authorities were carried out in order to gain a military advantage. This is certainly linked to 
the fact that the very notion of military advantage is one encapsulated in IHL, and is therefore 
beyond the legal remit in which the [Court] assesses violations of the ECHR'.53 She 
concluded: 'Without explicitly recognising that it is appraising the compliance of states with 
the core principles of IHL in non-international armed conflicts, the [Court] is in fact referring 
                                                 
49
 These were: the bombing of the civilian refugee column in October 1999 (Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v 
Russia (App No 57947/00, 57948/00 and 57949/00) ECHR 24 February 2005); the massacre in the 
Staropromyslovskiy district of Grozny (Khashiyev and Akayeva v Russia (App No 57942/00 and 57945/00) 
ECHR 24 February 2005); and the indiscriminate bombing of the village of Katyr-Yurt in February 2000 
(Isayeva v Russia (App No 57950/00) ECHR 24 February 2005). 
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 R Arnold and N Quenivet (eds), International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: Towards a New 
Merger in International Law (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). 
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 ibid, 1. 
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 CM Cerna, 'Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Implementation of International Humanitarian Law Norms by 
Regional Intergovernmental Human Rights Bodies' in F Kalshoven and Y Sandoz (eds), Implementation of 
International Humanitarian Law (The Hague, Kluwer, 1989) 31, 34. 
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 N Quenivet, 'The Right to Life in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law' in Arnold and 
Quenivet, International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law (n 50) 341. 
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to the main principles of the lex specialis'.54 and further: ‘What is remarkable is that the Court 
applies the detailed provisions applicable in times of international armed conflict to situations 
of non-international armed conflict’. I hope I have shown that the Court would very likely 
have reached a quite different result if it had been confronted with applying IHL to individual 
commanders. In my view, the ECtHR was able to make the findings of fact it did precisely 
because it was applying different standards within a very different conceptual frame-work. 
William Abresch, on the other hand, believed that the ECtHR had applied the doctrines it had 
developed on the use of force in law enforcement operations (for example, by the police), to 
high intensity conflicts involving large numbers of insurgents, artillery and aerial 
bombardment.55 He correctly observed that for lawyers trained and practising within IHL the 
law of international armed conflict would be the ideal proper law for internal armed conflict. 
He called this an 'internationalizing trajectory'.56 However, he contended that the ECtHR has 
broken from such a trajectory, in order to derive its own rules from the 'right to life' enshrined 
in Article 2 of the ECHR. His prognosis was that: 
given the resistance that states have shown to applying humanitarian law to internal 
armed conflicts, the ECtHR's adaptation of human rights law to this end may prove to 
be the most promising base for the international community to supervise and respond 
to violent interactions between the state and its citizens.57 
He therefore continued to believe that IHL was the proper law to be applied to situations such 
as the Chechen (or the Kurdish) conflicts. 
Abresch’s approach was in reality therefore not so far from that of Hampson, who clearly 
considers that the Strasbourg Court should take IHL into account to the extent of applying it, 
and believed that despite the fact that the Court has never referred to the applicability of IHL, 
'there is an awareness of the type of analysis that would be conducted under IHL'.58 In this she 
follows the 'classical' model of Doswald-Beck and Vité, who considered that 'the obvious 
advantages of human rights bodies using [IHL] is that [IHL] will become increasingly known 
to decision-makers and the public, who, it is hoped, will exert increasing pressure to obtain 
respect for it'.59  
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57
 ibid, 743. 
58
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Similarly, Aisling Reidy, who was one of the lawyers in the Turkish Kurdish cases, together 
with Hampson and the present author,60 considered that in the cases against Turkey, the 
Strasbourg Court was 'borrowing language from [IHL] when analysing the scope of human 
rights obligations. Such willingness to use humanitarian law concepts is encouraging'.61 She 
too saw this development as 'certainly welcome in so far as it contributes to a stronger 
framework for the protection of rights'.62 I disagree. I cannot see how the use of the alien 
framework of IHL in such a case would be 'encouraging'. 
I can illustrate these points by further reference to the Chechen cases at the ECtHR.63 These 
were cases brought by individual Chechen 'victims' against the Russian Federation. There 
could have been an inter-state case, and perhaps should have been; but this would still have 
been a complaint of violation of individual rights. The Chechen applicants in many ways 
spoke for the whole of their people. Their objective in the proceedings was not to obtain 
monetary compensation. What they wanted was the vindication, at the highest level, of the 
truth of their account of what had happened to them and to the mass of Chechens. At this 
level Russia's right to sovereign action was at stake. 
One by-product – entirely contingent as it happens – of the judgments in their favour, was the 
naming of perpetrators in the case of Isayeva v Russia, which concerned the indiscriminate 
bombing of the village of Katyr-Yurt in February 2000 ordered by senior Russian officers, 
General Shamanov and General Nedobytko. Findings of fact that amount to the commission 
of war crimes placed their investigation with a view to prosecution firmly on the agenda. In 
their submissions to the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers on compliance with the 
judgments in October 2005,64 the applicants argued that 'these two officers were found to 
have been responsible for a military operation which involved the "massive use of 
indiscriminate weapons" and which led, inter alia, to the loss of civilian lives and which has 
been found to have violated Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
applicants submit that in the light of the Court's findings ..., criminal proceedings should be 
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opened in respect of both of them.' It goes almost without saying that Russia never opened 
such proceedings. 
Finally, I turn to Alexander Orakhelashvili.65 He noted 'interdependence' of IHRL and IHL as 
explained by the ICJ in the Wall opinion, and 'parallelism' as displayed in DRC v Uganda. He 
cited the Kunarac case for the proposition that IHRL and IHL are 'mutually complementary'66 
and that 'their use for ascertaining each other's content and scope is both appropriate and 
inevitable'.67 He commented in detail on the first six Chechen cases,68 and concluded that 'the 
European Court's approach allows it to secure the legal outcome required under both human 
rights law and humanitarian law, even though it does not directly apply the provisions of the 
latter body of law, as norms falling outside its competence.'69  
This, I respectfully submit, is simply wrong. I have sought to show above that the 
defendant(s), the burden and standard of proof, and the evidential issues, would have been 
quite different had IHL been the proper body of law for these cases. Orakhelashvili's 
conclusion, with which I also disagree, is that 'the Court's approach should be based, as it 
mostly is, on the implicit application of the standards of humanitarian law, albeit cloaked in 
the Convention-specific categories of legitimacy, necessity and proportionality.'70 I return to 
the metaphor of chalk and cheese: these categories have an entirely different origin and 
content from those of IHL. 
 
Hassan v UK 
The first case in which the European Court of Human Rights expressly considered the 
relation between IHRL and IHL was the Grand Chamber judgment in Hassan v United 
Kingdom71. Under the heading ‘Relevant International Law’ the Court listed ‘Relevant 
provisions of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions’ (paragraph 33); The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Article 31 ‘General Rule of Interpretation’ 
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(paragraph 34); the ‘Case-law of the International Court of Justice concerning the inter-
relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law’ 
(paragraphs 35-37), notably the Advisory Opinion on The Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons (8 July 1996), paragraph 31; the Advisory Opinion on The Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (9 July 
2004) paragraph 106; the judgment in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo 
(Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) v. Uganda), (19 December 2005), paragraph 215-216; 
The Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission on Fragmentation of 
International Law (paragraph 38) and the Analytical Study of the Study Group on the same 
topic, dated 13 April 2006, (A/CN.4/L.682), paragraph 104; The House of Lords’ judgment 
in Al-Jedda (paragraph 39); ‘Derogations relating to detention under Article 15 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights’ (paragraphs 40-42). 
The Applicant submitted, as summarised by the Court: 
83.  The Court had often applied the Convention in situations of armed conflict and 
recognised that in principle it was not displaced (the applicant referred to the 
following cases: Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey72; Varnava and Others v. Turkey 
[GC]73; Al-Jedda, § 105; Al-Skeini, §§ 164-167). This was, moreover, supported by 
the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in The Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, § 106. In the 
applicant’s submission, the International Court of Justice was recognising in this 
passage that there might be some rights that fall within the scope of international 
humanitarian law but to which no human rights convention extended. In the 
applicant’s view, the position was that at most, the provisions of international 
humanitarian law might influence the interpretation of the provisions of the 
Convention. For example, they might be relevant in determining what acts were 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation for the purposes of a derogation 
from Article 2. In the context of Article 5, this might, in an appropriate case, inform 
the Court’s interpretation of “competent legal authority” and “offence” in Article 5 § 
1(c). However, it was not right that Article 5 was displaced in circumstances in which 
the Geneva Conventions were engaged. The Convention was a treaty aimed at 
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protecting fundamental rights. Its provisions should not be distorted, still less ignored 
altogether, to make life easier for States which failed to use the mechanism within the 
Convention that expressly dictated how they were to reconcile its provisions with the 
exigencies of war. 
84.  The applicant further contended that, in any event, the Government had not 
identified anything that United Kingdom forces were required to do by the Geneva 
Conventions that would have obliged them to act contrary to Article 5. The Iraq war 
was a non-international armed conflict following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s 
forces and the occupation by coalition forces. There was considerably less treaty law 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts than to international armed conflicts. 
International humanitarian law stipulated minimum requirements on States in 
situations of armed conflict but did not provide powers. In reality, the Government’s 
submission that the Convention should be “displaced” was an attempt to re argue the 
question of Article 1 jurisdiction which was decided in Al Skeini. If the Government’s 
position were correct, it would have the effect of wholly depriving victims of a 
contravention of any effective remedy, since the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions were not justiciable at the instance of an individual. Such a narrowing of 
the rights of individuals in respect of their treatment by foreign armed forces would be 
unprincipled and wrong. 
85.  Finally, even if the Court were to decide that Article 5 should be interpreted in 
the light of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, Tarek Hassan was arrested and 
detained as a means of inducing the applicant to surrender. The detention was 
arbitrary, it did not fall within any of the lawful categories under Article 5 § 1 and it 
was not even permissible under international humanitarian law. 
The Government submitted: 
86.  The Government submitted that the drafters of the Convention did not intend that 
an alleged victim of extra-territorial action in the active phase of an international 
armed conflict, such as a prisoner of war protected by the Third Geneva Convention, 
who might nonetheless wish to allege a breach of Article 5, would benefit from the 
protections of the Convention. There was nothing to suggest any such intent within 
the Convention or its travaux préparatoires, or indeed in the wording or travaux 
préparatoires of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which would have been at the 
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forefront of the minds of those drafting the Convention as establishing the relevant 
applicable legal regime. Furthermore, such intent would be inconsistent with the 
practical realities of conduct of active hostilities in an international armed conflict, 
and also with such Convention jurisprudence as there was bearing on the issue. 
The Human Rights Centre at the University of Essex made extensive submissions which were 
summarised by the Court in paragraphs 91-95.  
The Court recognised (paragraph 99) that ‘This is the first case in which a respondent State 
has requested the Court to disapply its obligations under Article 5 or in some other way to 
interpret them in the light of powers of detention available to it under international 
humanitarian law…’. The Court continued (paragraph 100) that ‘The starting point for the 
Court’s examination must be its constant practice of interpreting the Convention in the light 
of the rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 (see 
Golder v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, § 29, and 
many subsequent cases).’ The Court observed (paragraph 101) that ‘The practice of the High 
Contracting Parties is not to derogate from their obligations under Article 5 in order to detain 
persons on the basis of the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions during international armed 
conflicts… Moreover, it would appear that the practice of not lodging derogations under 
Article 15 of the Convention in respect of detention under the Third and Fourth Geneva 
Conventions during international armed conflicts is mirrored by State practice in relation to 
the International Covenant for the Protection of Civil and Political Rights.’ 
Having reviewed the ICJ case-law, the Court held: 
103. In the light of the above considerations, the Court accepts the Government’s 
argument that the lack of a formal derogation under Article 15 does not prevent the 
Court from taking account of the context and the provisions of international 
humanitarian law when interpreting and applying Article 5 in this case. 
104.  Nonetheless, and consistently with the case-law of the International Court of 
Justice, the Court considers that, even in situations of international armed conflict, the 
safeguards under the Convention continue to apply, albeit interpreted against the 
background of the provisions of international humanitarian law. 
… 
107.  Finally, although, for the reasons explained above, the Court does not consider it 
necessary for a formal derogation to be lodged, the provisions of Article 5 will be 
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interpreted and applied in the light of the relevant provisions of international 
humanitarian law only where this is specifically pleaded by the respondent State. 
The Court’s conclusion was (paragraph 110): ‘… it would appear that Tarek Hassan’s capture 
and detention was consistent with the powers available to the United Kingdom under the 
Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and was not arbitrary.’ 
This long-awaited clarification has aroused considerable discussion74.  
As always, the EJIL Talk blog provided excellent rapid reaction. For Lawrence Hill-
Cawthorne75, the Court had ‘…effectively read into Article 5(1) ECHR an extra permissible 
ground for detention where consistent with the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, and it 
read down the requirement of habeas corpus in Article 5(4) to allow for the administrative 
forms of review under the Fourth Geneva Convention.’ As to positive points in the Court’s 
judgment, he pointed out that ‘… the Court rejected the UK’s principal argument that IHL as 
the lex specialis precluded jurisdiction arising under Article 1 ECHR (para 77). To have 
followed this would effectively have been to displace the entire Convention where IHL 
applies.’ Second, the Court had refused to follow the UK ‘… on the notion of lex specialis. 
Instead, its reasoning rests on two tools of treaty interpretation under Article 31(3) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), namely subsequent practice (Article 
31(3)(b)) and other relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties (Article 31(3)(c)) (paras 100-102).’ Furthermore, ‘… the Court does not simply 
submit Article 5 ECHR to the more permissive treaty standards in the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Conventions. Rather, its approach to this relationship is more symbiotic.’ 
His first criticism of the Court was that ‘…whilst its reliance on Articles 31(3)(b) and (c) 
VCLT over the lex specialis maxim did, as noted, encourage greater clarity, it is not clear that 
either subsequent practice or Article 31(3)(c) quite so readily points to the conclusion at 
which the Court arrived.’ He identified the Court’s reliance on state practice of non-
derogation. He also raised a ‘more general question about the propriety of using subsequent 
practice in a manner that effectively modifies treaty obligations.’ 
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Marko Milanovic followed with ‘… some thoughts on the practical impact of Hassan, its 
bottom line and possible future influence.’76 As to the bottom line, he emphasised that ‘… 
whenever the military forces of a European state capture any individual, no matter where that 
individual is located… the Convention will apply by virtue of the personal conception of 
Article 1 jurisdiction as authority and control over individuals…. In short, European soldiers 
carry the ECHR with them whenever they engage in capture operations.’ Moreover, ‘… the 
most striking features of the judgment are its refusal to apply (or even mention) the lex 
specialis principle, and the fact that it is confined to situations of international armed conflict 
only.’ Of course, ‘…the Court’s re-interpretation of Article 5 is tantamount to its 
amendment.’ Judgment in the case of Jaloud v. Netherlands followed swiftly on 20 
November 2014, but did not shake the approach taken in Hassan.77 
Shaheed Fatima QC published a two-part commentary, under the heading ‘Reflections on 
Hassan v UK: A Mixed Bag on the Right to Liberty.’78 She was also critical of the Grand 
Chamber, in particular its starting point that state practice regarding both the ECHR and 
ICCPR is not to enter derogations regarding detentions made pursuant to the Third and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions: 
This premise does not support the GC’s conclusion because the state practice simply 
begs the questions: what are the reasons explaining the state practice and what (if 
anything) do those reasons say about whether IHL may be used when assessing the 
human rights’ lawfulness of detentions? The GC should have considered these 
questions. In particular, the GC should have considered whether the state practice is 
explicable (partly at least) by reference to jurisdictional issues and therefore whether 
it has any continuing relevance to the relationship between IHL/IHRL. 
Finally, Diane Webber, in ASIL Insights, wrote in 2015 under the heading: ‘Hassan v. United 
Kingdom: A New Approach to Security Detention in Armed Conflict?’79 She concluded by 
suggesting that: 
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… a subtle difference can be discerned between the approach of the ECHR and [UN 
Human Rights Committee] HRC. The ECHR requires armed conflict security 
detention to comply with Section 5 European Convention, whereas the HRC assumes 
in principle that armed conflict security detention complies with Section 9 ICCPR. So 
parties to the European Convention are required to be satisfied that armed conflict 
detention is not arbitrary, whereas parties to the ICCPR are not required to take that 
extra step. States that are parties to both Conventions might be advised to ensure that 
security detentions in armed conflict comply with the more stringent requirements 
enumerated by the ECHR. 
What is clear is that the spectre of lex specialis has been definitely laid to rest by the Grand 
Chamber in Hassan. 
 
V. The African System Gets Involved 
In November 2015, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the 
Commission) adopted General Comment (GC) no. 3 on the right to life.80 The GC deals with 
a variety of issues surrounding the right to life, inter alia the death penalty, use of force in law 
enforcement and armed conflict, investigations and accountability, and extraterritoriality. The 
GC also considers the relationship between the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR) and IHL. 
The GC states: 
32. In armed conflict, what constitutes an ‘arbitrary’ deprivation of life during the 
conduct of hostilities is to be determined by reference to international humanitarian 
law. This law does not prohibit the use of force in hostilities against lawful targets (for 
example combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities) if necessary from 
a military perspective, provided that, in all circumstances, the rules of distinction, 
proportionality and precaution in attack are observed. Any violation of international 
humanitarian law resulting in death, including war crimes, will be an arbitrary 
deprivation of life 
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On 7 June 2016 Vito Todeschini commented on EJIL Talk.81 He pointed out that this 
paragraph was ‘… interesting in respect of three elements: the concept of ‘arbitrariness’ with 
regard to acts of deprivation of life in armed conflict; the interpretive principle employed to 
connect the ACHPR and IHL; and the legal consequences arising from IHL violations when 
human rights law also applies.’ Furthermore, like the Strasbourg Court, the Commission ‘… 
refrained from invoking lex specialis to read the interplay between IHL and human rights 
law’, and confirmed that ‘…systemic integration, not lex specialis, is the appropriate 
interpretive principle to operationalise the relationship between norms of IHL and human 
rights law.’ 
Most importantly, the Commission had affirmed that ‘…an attack causing death in violation 
of IHL rules amounts to an arbitrary deprivation of life. … For the first time, a human rights 
treaty body made it explicit that, when human rights law norms are placed in the background 
to favour the application of IHL norms, a breach of the latter entails a violation of the 
former.’ 
This has momentous consequences for the availability of remedies: ‘The acknowledgment 
that a breach of the IHL targeting rules resulting in death amounts to an arbitrary deprivation 
of life opens the way to individuals for obtaining redress for IHL violations via the right to a 
remedy under human rights law.’ I very much agree with Todeschini’s conclusion: ‘Overall, 
the African Commission’s GC may constitute a significant contribution to strengthen the 
enforcement of victims’ right to reparation for both IHL and human rights violations in armed 
conflict.’ 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The invitation to prepare this contribution has come at an auspicious time, when some much 
needed clarity has emerged as to the relationship between IHRL and IHL. While I do not 
retract my remarks as to chalk and cheese, and the very different origins of the two branches 
of law, all three regional human rights systems have now taken giant steps to augmenting the 
protection of civilians caught up in armed conflict.  
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